Lessons from the past for weapons of the future by Mickevičiūtė, Neringa
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Comparative Jurisprudence
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/icj
Lessons from the past for weapons of the future☆
Neringa Mickevičiūtė
Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania







Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion
Legal weapons review
A B S T R A C T
One of the key postulates of modern law of armed conﬂict or international humanitarian law
(IHL) is that the choice of weapons by ﬁghting parties is not unlimited. Thus, in order to ensure
excessive harm is not inﬂicted, certain weapons are prohibited or their use is restricted. Although
every case is quite unique, limitations related to weapons attest to the fact that eﬀects of ordinary
use of those weapons were deemed incompatible with the requirements of IHL. This article
examines the potential for regulation of lethal autonomous weapons, while at the same time
drawing upon lessons from the past. The analysis covers various ways how IHL restricts the
choice of means of warfare – formal regulation, application of customary rules and principles to
a weapon, and legal weapons review – all of which oﬀer valuable insights on how to
accommodate rising legal uncertainty over autonomous weapons. In this respect, the ‘headliner’
of World War II, the nuclear weapon, serves as an exceptional example that some weapons bring
about unparalleled regulatory challenges. Like atom bomb, lethal autonomous weapons mark
revolutionary changes in warfare. Yet, this article is to conﬁrm applicability and adaptability of
IHL to any new weapon, including an autonomous one.
1. Introduction
Humanitarian concerns for all those caught up in armed conﬂicts are, in classical understanding of the law of armed conﬂict or
international humanitarian law (hereafter – IHL), reﬂected in two ways. Firstly, they are entrenched in standards of protection for
victims of armed conﬂicts (be they civilians, injured combatants, or prisoners of war). Secondly, they are embedded in limitations of
means and methods of warfare. The adequacy of the latter body of rules,1 even with its expansion over the years, is being constantly
challenged by development and deployment of new weapons. Already Henry Dunant, the founding member of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter – ICRC), gave a prophetic warning about future weapons becoming more frightful and future
wars much deadlier (Dunant, 1986, p. 128). The epitomy of that was World War II: a handful of new weapons, the most (in)famous
being the atom bomb, were ﬁelded and the human loss was unparalleled. To date nuclear weapons stand as an interesting example of
interplay between politics and law that resists clear and conclusive assesment from IHL perspective. Nonetheless, the need for IHL
to ensure humanitarian considerations were at play when belligerents chose means of warfare has become ever more pronounced.
However, IHL might be facing a new challenge with a prospect of another unprecedented military technology – lethal
autonomous weapons (hereafter – LAWS). Artiﬁcial intelligence and robotics researchers warn that we are on the brink of yet
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another global arms race (Future of Life Institute, 2015), even more intense than the one we have witnessed with nuclear arms, and
can currently see the revival of (Pifer, 2016). . Thus, in order to prevent abuses of and ensure respect for IHL, various regulatory
experiences and how they can contribute to the search for legal framework for LAWS will be analysed. To this end, in the ﬁrst part of
this article prospect of formal regulation of LAWS and some related contentious issues will be discussed. In the second part, the IHL
principles directly related to weapons will be elaborated on to see if they eliminate a risk of legal vacuum with regards to
development and deployment of LAWS, formal regulation pending. Finally, legal weapons review will also be analysed as one of the
tools to address legality of any new weapon, including LAWS.
2. How IHL2 restricts the choice of means of warfare
Throughout the human history and history of wars we have witnessed numerous signiﬁcant advancements in (military)
technology, conditioning serious changes in military engagements. Conﬂicts are fought with weapons, so, naturally, the importance
of achieving superior arsenal than that of one's enemy is undeniable. Yet, the need to limit the choice of permissible weaponry has
both pragmatic and humanitarian underpinnings and is, thus, at the roots of modern IHL. Many of the related rules are now codiﬁed
and can be found in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts (1978; hereafter – Additional Protocol I). However, some new weapons, like LAWS can
pose more complex challenges than others. In order to assess the potential regulation of LAWS, both current initiatives and some
contentious issues that may hinder legislative eﬀorts are discussed below.
2.1. How weapons are regulated under IHL
Regulation of speciﬁc weapons is achieved in two ways: limits are set through either prohibitions on the use or restrictions upon
the manner of deployment of speciﬁc weapons (Mathews & McCormack, 1999). In some cases, “weapons may not necessarily be
forbidden or questionable but might, in due course, be ripe for regulation.” (Detter, 2016, p. 262). This is important, in particular,
when the use of a certain weapon results in conﬂicting practices and those who use them invoke diﬀerent legal reasoning.3
Formal international restrictions or prohibitions were achieved regarding a number of weapons: exploding bullets, expanding
bullets, chemical and biological weapons, weapons that injure with non-detectable fragments, mines, booby-traps and improvised
explosive devices, incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons, explosive remnants of war, anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions.
In each case the eﬀects of normal use of a particular weapon were emphasized to argue the necessity of restrictions or a ban. And
those eﬀects could be summarized as indiscriminate, excessively injurious, going beyond the level of reasonable military advantage,
or simply abhorrent. In short, such eﬀects were deemed contrary to the requirements of IHL.
Despite the destructive power and disastrous eﬀects of nuclear weapons, no universal ban (like with other mass destruction
weapons) exists,4 reminding that States and their interests are the driving force behind international agreements. Also, as mentioned
above, some regulatory initiatives fall under arms control regimes rather than within the scope of IHL.
Almost all of the above-mentioned weapons were deployed on actual battleﬁelds, so the results of their use were well recorded.
However, prohibition of blinding laser weapons was adopted even before it had actually been used on the battleﬁeld (Doswald-Beck,
1996). It oﬀers an important lesson to take away: it is possible to exert pressure and achieve regulatory success without actually
ﬁelding the weapon. What is also important to note here is that most of the prohibitions or restrictions on speciﬁc weapons
mentioned above now make part of customary law (ICRC Customary IHL Database, 2016).5 It attests to accumulated opinio juris
and state practice, as well as a universal recognition of devastating eﬀects of these weapons. In order to further assess prospective
regulation of LAWS, it is, therefore, necessary to understand deﬁning characteristics of a weapon, eﬀects of its ordinary use, and
what issues a formal agreement should and potentially could address.
2.2. Prospects of regulation of LAWS
LAWS have been a widely debated topic for several years now, as rapid technological progress might at some point in the future
result in once sci-ﬁ scenarios. The debate covers a wide range of questions. Practitioners and scholars have diﬀerent answers to these
questions that feed into diﬀerent understanding of potential regulation of LAWS. Some support an outright ban of LAWS, some
argue in favor of certain restrictions and limitations regarding the building and use of LAWS, and some believe the debate over
regulation of LAWS is premature.
Full autonomy is not yet achieved, however, application-speciﬁc artiﬁcial intelligence has for years been used in battleﬁelds.
Examples of such use include image processing and target recognition, missile defence systems, battle management systems,
2 This article is dedicated to explore the rules applicable in armed conﬂicts, i. e. IHL, and how they instruct the choices of belligerent parties. Arms control regimes
play an even more important role in restricting the development of weapons, but they do not fall within the scope of this article.
3 One of the examples could be unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Although there is little evidence to support per se illegality of UAVs, the diverse practice of their
usage and legal arguments that are brought forward to argue they are used lawfully might eventually lead to formal regulation.
4 Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – an instrument to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and achieve nuclear disarmament –
was adopted in 1968.
5 Customary rules are established regarding poison and poisoned weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, expanding bullets, exploding bullets, weapons
primarily injuring by non-detectable fragments, booby-traps, landmines, incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons.
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autopilots, simulations, etc. Full autonomy in weapon systems not only could enable machines to perform more complex tasks, but
could eventually mean that humans do not take “life and death” decisions and are not even able to understand the process that leads
up to them.
Before we explore the question of perspective regulation of LAWS, it is necessary to establish a working deﬁnition for further
analysis, as there is no internationally agreed deﬁnition. Philosopher of technology dr. Asaro (2012) suggests that LAWS could be
understood as “[…] any automated system that can initiate lethal force without the speciﬁc, conscious, and deliberate decision of a
human operator, controller, or supervisor” (p. 694). The ICRC, one of the driving forces behind the discussions on regulatings
LAWS, suggests that deﬁnition of autonomous weapons (or autonomous weapon systems) is “an umbrella term”. To further frame
the discussions of stakeholders, the ICRC (2016) proposes to deﬁne LAWS the following way: “Any weapon system with autonomy in
its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. search for or detect, identify, track, select) and attack (i.e. use force
against, neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without human intervention” (p. 71). Both Asaro's and the ICRC's deﬁnitions
highlight the key characteristic in distinguishing LAWS from other weapons (like remotely controlled ones): the exclusion of human
operators from critical stages of weapon deployment.
As mentioned above, the concerns voiced in the debate over LAWS translate into diﬀerent positions regarding potential
regulation: a ban, speciﬁc regulation (certain restrictions), or no regulation (at least for the time being). There is a need to delineate
what each of these options mean and what arguments are used to support them. Proponents of a ban of LAWS suggest such a
prohibition should be adopted as soon as possible, before artiﬁcial general intelligence and full autonomy is achieved. Many artiﬁcial
intelligence and robotics researchers are calling for “a ban on oﬀensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control”
(Future of Life Institute, 2015). This does not mean that all weapons with autonomous capacities should be banned. It means that
oﬀensive weapons without human supervision in their critical functions could not be developed and deployed. Thus, weapons would
no longer be fully autonomous, as their key feature – unsupervised decision-making – would be eliminated. Proponents of such a
proposal list a number of reasons why a ban is necessary: potential arms race, lowering of the threshold for resorting to military
force, incompatability with the laws of armed conﬂict, and ethical concerns (Docherty, Human Rights Watch & Harvard Law School,
2012). From the perspective of IHL it is important to address the latter two, and answer several questions: (1) whether autonomous
weapons could ensure respect for IHL, and (2) whether IHL entails a requirement for humans to remain “in the loop”. The ﬁrst
question will be adressed in the second part of this article, where the meaning of main IHL principles pertinent to weapons and their
applicability to LAWS will be analysed. It is worth noting here, however, that there is a general agreement that, “as with all weapon
systems, the rules of IHL are fully applicable to LAWS” (Biontino, 2016, p. 8). Thus, compliance with the requirements of IHL has to
be ensured. The second question raises fundamental concerns about the nature of IHL. Asaro (2012) asserts:
[IHL] is […] anthropocentric. Despite the best eﬀorts of its authors to be clear and precise, applying IHL requires multiple levels
of interpretation in order to be eﬀective in a given situation. IHL […] explicitly requires combatants to reﬂexively consider the
implications of their actions, and to apply compassion and judgment in an explicit appeal to their humanity. (p. 700)
This is not merely a theoretical consideration: soldiers are encouraged to use their “gut feeling” in the ﬁeld (Geiss, 2015, p. 14),
and obviously this is something that is unattainable for machines. It is also argued that the idea of restraint – which is one of the
cornerstones of IHL – is established through reciprocity of risk shared among belligerents in a battleﬁeld (Evangelidi, 2016). Such
reciprocity would be obliterated should humans be retreated not only from a physical battleﬁeld, but also from taking lethal
decisions. UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Heyns (2013), concludes in line with the
opponents of LAWS, “Machines lack morality and mortality, and should as a result not have life and death powers over humans” (p.
17). Heyns (2016) also notes, “[…] something may be lawful but be awful […]” (p. 6), thus placing the emphasis not on legal
arguments alone, but on the shared understanding of what future battleﬁelds should look like.
Those who urge to consider speciﬁc regulation of LAWS have to deal with speculative scenarios. Experts predict that LAWS
“might be given more freedom of action, for example: increased mobility to operate outside tightly constrained spatial and temporal
limits, and increased capacity to determine their own functions and targets, or to react to changing circumstances” (ICRC, 2016, p.
77). Lack of predictability with regards to functionality of future LAWS only exacerbates the prospects of any legislative eﬀorts. On
the other hand, precautionary measures can be taken even if all eﬀects of a weapon cannot be foreseen, but there are reasons to
believe at least some would be too harmful (Biontino, 2016). As the ICRC (2016) argues:
Indeed, deploying a weapon system whose eﬀects are wholly or partially unpredictable would create a signiﬁcant risk that IHL
will not be respected. The risks may be too high to allow use of the weapon, or else mitigating the risks may require limiting or
even obviating the weapons’ autonomy. (p. 81)
The goal of speciﬁc regulation could be to settle some really contentious issues, like liability for violations of IHL, concepts of
“meaningful human control” or “appropriate human judgement”, level of supervision in diﬀerent stages of the “life cycle” of LAWS,
or preference of non-lethal response. The resolution of these issues is, however, dependent on technical and operational parameters
of LAWS. There is also an on-going debate about applicability of various control mechanisms, or “brakes”, that could be both
technological and normative. Illustrative examples are Arkin's (2007) “ethical governor”, an in-built feedback loop, or Thurnher's
(2012) four control measures for commanders of LAWS (proper rules of engagement, limited deployment scenarios, context of
conventional warfare, and guarantees of human oversight and override). However, more detailed regulatory eﬀorts are rather
diﬃcult to argue for at this stage.
Finally, some argue that debate over the regulation of LAWS is premature, given that fully autonomous weapons are not yet
developed. Such concerns are raised in informal talks, and some states remain “hesitant” to engage in more concrete negotiations
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(Biontino, 2016, p. 12). Yet, the discussion appears to be moving towards acknowledging a need to establish certain limitations in
advance.
2.3. Current regulatory endeavors
There were three informal expert meetings in 2014, 2015 and 2016 convened within the review framework of the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Eﬀects (1980; hereafter – Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or CCW). Opinions were diverse on
numerous issues: from deﬁnition6 to timing7 to arguing about the appropriateness of the CCW framework8 to pondering about the
necessity of a preemptive ban.9
The CCW framework oﬀers plenty of ﬂexibility to either prohibit, or limit the use of the weapon, as well as set restrictions on, for
example, development, production or transfer of LAWS. As it is necessary to consider dual-eﬀects of artiﬁcial intelligence technology,
the CCW framework can accommodate such demands. Adoption of the CCW Protocol IV on the blinding laser weapons (1995) oﬀer
great lessons in this regard (Mines Action Canada, 2014). Still, the momentum is just building and it is diﬃcult to say how States
would further engage in any more concrete and formalized legislative processes with regards to LAWS.
3. How general principles and customary rules of IHL restrict the choice of weapons
Lack of speciﬁc regulation, i. e. a ban or a set of restrictions, does not suggest that a certain weapon would be ipso facto
permissible. On the contrary, general (fundamental) principles and customary rules of IHL also play an important role in limiting
belligerents’ choice of means and methods of warfare. Opinions diﬀer as to the direct eﬀects of principles and if, independent of
treaty law, they suﬃce to render a weapon illegal (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996). However, it is argued here that
weapons cannot be deployed in armed conﬂicts contrary to the requirements of the principles. This means that, even if a certain
weapon could not be proclaimed illegal on the basis of a principle alone, it could still be unlawful to use it in battleﬁeld because of its
incompatability with the principles.
Essential, and most relevant to this analysis, are principles of distinction (between civilians and combatants, civilians objects and
military objectives) and prohibition on causing unnecessary suﬀering, both of which make part of customary IHL, as well. These
principles are considered to be “cardinal”, “intransgressible”, and embedded with a character which “permeates the entire law of
armed conﬂict” (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996, p. 257). They are not based on a separate source of law; rather, they are
derived from treaties, custom and general principles of law (Sassoli, Bouvier & Quitin, 2012). For this reason, they will be analysed
with reference to those sources, in particular, customary law. This way will also help show the principles as expressing the meaning
of rules, supporting them and their interpretation. In addition to this, distinct attention will be paid to the so-called Martens clause,
and if it can truly serve to ﬁll in any potential regulatory gaps.
3.1. Principle of distinction
Principle of distinction (or discrimination) can be found in numerous IHL instruments and it is also a customary rule (Rule 1,
n.d.) applicable in both international and non-international armed conﬂicts. As such, it is binding on all parties in armed conﬂicts,
including non-state actors.
The rationale of the principle is clear: indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under IHL. So, parties have to distinguish between
civilians and combatants, civilian objects and military objectives at all times. When analysed with reference to the means of warfare,
the principle takes shape of the following customary rule: “The use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate is prohibited”
(Rule 71, n.d.). Thus, the principle of distinction is not only about target identiﬁcation10 and reliable intelligence, but also very much
about deploying only those weapons that can be directed at military objectives or whose eﬀects can be limited as required by IHL.
Therefore, it is linked to both the manner of use and the nature (design) of a weapon. While it is obvious that any weapon can be used
contrary to the requirements of IHL, it is also a fact that intrinsic features of a weapon might preclude any distinction between
civilian and military targets. Examples of such indiscriminate weapons, as already established in customary law, range from anti-
6 In 2014: “The issue of a deﬁnition was raised by a number of delegations. While some suggested that a clariﬁcation would be necessary at a certain stage if more
substantial work were to be undertaken, most of the delegations indicated that it was too early to engage in such a negotiation.” (Simon-Michel, 2014, p. 3.). In 2015:
“While some organisations called for rigorous deﬁnitions, others argued that, at this stage of the debate, an adequate framework for regulations should take priority
over deﬁnitions.” (Biontino, 2015, p. 6.) In 2016: “A large number of delegations emphasized the need for a better understanding of LAWS. In this regard, delegations
stressed the need for a working deﬁnition at this stage, while others noted that this endeavour is problematic given that LAWS do not yet exist. In addition, some
delegations indicated the need for further discussion on possible elements of a deﬁnition.” (Biontino, 2016, p. 3.)
7 Some delegations questioned the meetings at the stage where LAWs are not yet developed.
8 “Delegations expressed their appreciation for the discussions within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). With a wide
range of experts on military matters, international law and humanitarian issues, the CCW could guarantee a balance between humanitarian concerns and security
aspects. Some delegations underlined the need for a fact-based discussion. Other delegations added that the human rights aspects of the issue should be addressed
and that the CCW might not be the only appropriate framework for discussion on LAWS.” (Biontino, 2015, p. 4–5).
9 “In light of the unpredictable and potentially harmful consequences of such developments, several delegations reiterated their call for a pre-emptive ban. It was
also recognized, however, that some delegations are hesitant regarding possible regulation of such systems given the lack of certainty about the nature of LAWS and
that they do not yet exist.” (Biontino, 2016, p. 12).
10 With regards to this, what IHL considers to be a legitimate target becomes of particular importance. Yet, it is outside the scope of present analysis.
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personnel landmines to chemical or biological weapons.
3.2. Prohibition on causing unnecessary suﬀering
IHL was developed with an embedded notion of minimizing horrors of war and limiting military force to the purpose of achieving
military advantage over one's enemy. It was established quite early in the history of laws of war that inﬂicting suﬀering and losses
that were beyond what was militarily necessary was not acceptable. Concerns for the fate of, in particular, those engaged in ﬁghting
shaped the following rule: “The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superﬂuous injury or
unnecessary suﬀering is prohibited” (Rule 70, n.d.). It is now both written and customary norm of IHL, applicable in international
and internal armed conﬂicts.
This rule focuses on the eﬀects of a weapon that are not user-dependent and reﬂects a ﬁne balance that belligerent parties ought
to strike between military necessity and expected injury or suﬀering that a weapon is to inﬂict on a person under conditions of its
ordinary use. The rule is violated if injury or suﬀering “is out of proportion to the military advantage sought” (Rule 70, n.d.). Yet, it is
not an easy task to assess if, for example, a machete causes necessary suﬀering or an injury from a gas attack is superﬂuous. State
practice that support the rule (Rule 70, n.d.) points towards certain criteria to help determine if the principle would be breached:
inevitability of serious permanent disability or inevitability of death as a result of regular use of a weapon. However, one would
desire a greater level of objectivity with regards to deﬁnitions of “unnecessary suﬀering” and “superﬂuous injury” – all the more so
because it is in the interest of specialists from many ﬁelds: law, medicine, politics, communication, weapon manufacturing, etc.
With support of the ICRC certain recommendations were released in an attempt to oﬀer objective means to determine,
understand and quantify design-dependent and foreseeable harm caused by present and future weapons (Coupland, 1997). This
report (p. 23) suggests that “unnecessary suﬀering and superﬂuous injury” occur when weapons in normal use cause: (1) speciﬁc
disease, speciﬁc abnormal physiological state, speciﬁc abnormal psychological state, speciﬁc and permanent disability or speciﬁc
disﬁgurement; or (2) ﬁeld mortality of more than 25% or a hospital mortality of more than 5%; or (3) large wounds as measured by
the Red Cross wound classiﬁcation; or (4) eﬀects for which there is no well recognized and proven treatment. It is important to note
that the baseline above-mentioned eﬀects are measured against are the eﬀects of conventional weapons. It is established that
conventional weapons “[…] utilize projectiles or (non-nuclear) explosions and, as a function of their design, inﬂict physical injury by
imparting kinetic energy but not foreseeably to a speciﬁc part of the body. Treatment requirements for such injury are well deﬁned”
(Coupland, 1997, p. 7).
Applying the criteria listed above to new weapons is not intended to make weapons acceptable from a moral perspective, as any
weapon in battle generates suﬀering. Yet, recommended criteria can facilitate a legal judgement and help belligerents meet their
obligations under the principle.
3.3. The Martens clause
The clause was ﬁrst introduced in the preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (Schindler and Toman, 1988), and it reads as follows:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity
and the requirements of the public conscience.
This clause – later reiterated in a number of legal instruments and relied upon in international jurisprudence – drew a lot of
attention, not least because, “it is very loosely worded and has consequently given rise to a multiplicity of often conﬂicting
interpretations.” (Cassese, 2000, p. 188). However, Judge Meron (2000) warns that signiﬁcance of the clause should not be
overrated: “Except in extreme cases, its references to principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience cannot, alone,
deligitimize weapons and methods of war, especially in contested cases” (p. 88). So, one has be cautious with application of the
Martens clause to speciﬁc situations or speciﬁc weapons, as there are many steps from lex desiderata to lex lata.
3.4. Applying the principles
One of the most interesting cases of applying the principles of IHL to a speciﬁc weapon comes with the ‘headliner’ of WWII – the
atom bomb. In 1945, the International Military Tribunal (1947) in Nuremberg recognized the customary nature of principles in
question. It was acknowledged that “[…] by 1939 these rules laid down in the [1907 Hague] Convention [(IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto] were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war […]” (p. 254). This included limitations on enemies’ choice of weapons, prohibition
of causing suﬀering that exceeded military advantage, and requirements to only attack military targets. However, the issue of atomic
bombings and their compatability with the principles was not addressed.
The actual use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although, not the legality of atomic weapons as such, had been
addressed in 1963 Shimoda case by the District Court of Tokyo (Falk, 1965). It was found that the use of new weapons was legal if
international law did not prohibit it. However, the attacks were pronounced illegal based on their indiscriminate nature (being
directed against undefended cities with no concentration of military objectives) and unnecessary suﬀering they produced (Falk,
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1965, p. 776). Still, such conclusions were reached relying mainly on the statutory law at the time.
More than three decades later, the International Court of Justice (hereafter – Court, ICJ) adressed the legality of nuclear
weapons in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. The Court came to a diﬀerent conclusion than the court in Shimoda case,
stating that the absence of prohibition does not prove the existence of customary norm. While recognizing uniqueness,
unprecedented destructive capacity and long-lasting devastating eﬀects of nuclear weapons, the ICJ also referred to the principles,
indicating that the “use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements” (Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion, 1996, p. 262). Yet, even those in charge of drafting the Advisory Opinion, accepted the fact that the Court's “reply
may seem unsatisfactory” (Bedjaoui, 1996, p. 269). The Court ultimately found itself in no position “to conclude with certainty that
the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles” (p. 263). This conclusion was not, however, achieved
through the application of principles to speciﬁc situations, as was rightly expected from the Court. As McCormack (1997) lamented,
“the Court wholly failed to enter into this process”. Nevertheless, there could be certain scenarios when the use of nuclear weapons
could theoretically be deemed compatible with, for instance, the requirements of principle of distinction. These are essentially
situations where no distinction has to really be made, as no or few civilians are speculated to be present at the place of the attack or
within its foreseeable reach. For example, using a tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy submarine equipped with nuclear
weapons that has already ﬁred or is about to ﬁre a nuclear missile; or using nuclear weapon against an enemy army situated in a
desert (Casey-Maslen, 2014, p. 5–6). Yet, the Court only invoked extreme circumstances of self-defence, when the survival of a state
would be at stake, to support its non-ﬁnding conclusion. Thus, it argued it could not give a deﬁnitive answer.11 As the ICJ President
Bedjaoui (1996) explained, the Court “sought to avoid any temptation to create new law” and “could not say what the law does not
say” (p. 47–48).
The Martens clause was also invoked by the Court, which stated that the clause “proved to be an eﬀective means of addressing the
rapid evolution of military technology” (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, p. 257). Although the Court further conﬁrmed its
“continuing existence and applicability” (p. 260), the issue of an actual interpretation of the clause when considering the legality of a
particular weapon was not resolved (Meron, 2000). Thus, it remains unclear if Martens clause could serve as an eﬀective tool to ﬁll in
any regulatory gaps.
Despite the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion causing controversy ever since, they serve as an important lesson for assesment
of future weapons. Stemming from the example of nuclear weapons, if a new weapon can even under limited circumstances be used
in compliance with IHL, then pronouncing it illegal based on potential incompatability with principles of IHL would be “creating
new law”. The ICRC (2016) expresses “serious doubts about the capability of developing and using autonomous weapon systems that
would comply with IHL in all but the narrowest of scenarios and the simplest of environments, at least for the foreseeable future” (p.
80). Yet, such narrow scenarios might be enough to argue LAWS could engage legitimate targets and be used in hostilities lawfully.
Thus, it has to be concluded that illegality of LAWS based on the principles alone could hardly be sustained at this stage.
However, the ICRC (2016) has speciﬁcally called on States to set limits on autonomy in weapon systems, so that it would be
acceptable under the principles of IHL (p. 7). Therefore, principles remain very important in assessing the weapons and their
deployment, so that not only the letter, but also the spirit of the law would prevail.
4. Legal weapons review
It is well established that the use of new weapons cannot run counter to IHL rules and principles, and that combatants’ choice of
means and methods of warfare is not unlimited. Both statutory and customary IHL require belligerents to take feasible measures
during attacks to not violate IHL. It means not using weapons that, although per se legal, might cause illegal consequences in a
particular given context. This is covered by the requirements stipulated in Art. 36 and Art. 82 of Additional Protocol I. Art. 36 is the
key provision that obliges States to carry out legal weapons review:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is
under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or
by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.
Arguably, this requirement applies to all States – both parties and non-parties to Additional Protocol I: “It ﬂows logically from
the truism that States are prohibited from using illegal weapons, means and methods of warfare or from using weapons, means and
methods of warfare in an illegal manner” (Lawand, Coupland, Herby & ICRC, 2006, p. 4). The signiﬁcance of the provision stems
from its preventative purpose, and it “remains, together with the Hague Regulations, the only instrument in the law of armed conﬂict
that can act as a brake on the abuses resulting from the arms race or on the possibility of future abuses […]” (Pilloud et al., 1987, p.
427).
Art. 36 is complimented with additional requirements stipulated in Art. 82:
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conﬂict in time of armed conﬂict, shall ensure that legal advisers
are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and
this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.
11 Judge Fleischhauer argued in a separate opinion that deﬁnitive answer could not be provided because there was no hierarchy of principles, i. e. the principle of
distinction could not be pronounced overriding the principle of self-defence: “there is no rule in international law according to which one of the conﬂicting principles
would prevail over the other.” (Fleischhauer, 1996, p. 307).
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This is a very important rule given that programming of tasks for LAWS might be time-sensitive and functionality of LAWS might
be of constantly evolving nature (due to potential learning capacity of AI). Thus, review of appropriateness of weapons before an
attack also seems crucial.
In order to comply with the Art. 36 requirements, States are to establish internal procedures (Pilloud et al., 1987, p. 424).
However, it appears that only a handful of States have institutionalized or put certain (formal) procedures in place to carry out legal
weapons review (Lawand et al., 2006). Although the step-by-step practice of States is rather scarce, the review has to preferably be
multidisciplinary, involving experts from diﬀerent ﬁelds. This seems to be in particular important in relation to LAWS.
Understanding their capabilities and foreseeing their eﬀects might become an increasingly diﬃcult task in the future, if LAWS
become less predictable. Predictability of the use of LAWS might be a complex issue, thus, the legal review oﬀers exactly the platform
to address it. If review would not yield reliable conclusions, then certain restrictions could and should be placed on the use of LAWS:
“Constraints on or parameters for the use of the weapon can be integrated into the military instructions for the use of the weapon, for
instance to limit the use to a speciﬁc environment or situation” (ICRC, 2016, p. 84).
There is also a concern that without common internationally agreed standards on LAWS, the national legal review of weapons
might be abused by some States that would resort to reviews “to legitimize their weapons, rather than to ﬁlter unlawful systems”
(Biontino, 2016, p. 9). On the other hand, when international regulation is absent, national review is an obligation States have to
respect and abide by. If a state does not carry out a legal review of a weapon, it “will be responsible in any case for any wrongful
damage ensuing” (Pilloud et al., 1987, p. 423). Therefore, Art. 36, even with inherent deﬁciencies,12 is an important tool to prevent
deployment of LAWS without previous legal assessment.
5. Conclusions
Technological progress in relation to LAWS ﬁnds us at the crossroads regarding potential legal developments. In order to assess
the prospects of regulating LAWS, key characteristics of these weapons and some contentious issues were analysed. The debate and
concerns surrounding LAWS have encouraged States to start informal talks on pertinent legal issues, like deﬁnition of LAWS,
suitable framework for potential regulation, and concepts of “autonomy” and “meaningful human control”. Although there is no
agreement on either, there is, however, a consensus that any future use of LAWS must comply with IHL. There is also an
understanding that the risk of violating IHL cannot be tolerated due to uncertainty surrounding the future characteristics of LAWS.
Thus, precautionary measures, like limiting autonomy, ought to be taken if eﬀects of ordinary use of LAWS cannot be predictable
and reliable, or some eﬀects are deemed to be harmful. To this end, CCW framework can oﬀer ﬂexibility that is ﬁt to capture and
accommodate the complexity of regulating LAWS. Secondly, IHL principles related to the use of weapons, namely, principle of
distinction and prohibition to cause superﬂuous injury and unnecessary suﬀering, play a signiﬁcant role in assesing the legality of the
use of LAWs and inspiring related future regulation. However, they cannot in their own right deligitimize LAWS, as was illustrated
with the example of nuclear weapons. Yet, in the absence of speciﬁc regulation, a use of any weapon must be compatible with the
requirements of the principles. Finally, an obligation to carry out legal review of new weapons oﬀers safeguards that can prevent
abuse. If States were not to respect their obligation to assess the legality of LAWS, they run into a risk of being held responsible for
any wrongful acts as a result of using them. All in all, it appears that lessons of the past can support our present eﬀorts to avoid
loosing touch with humanitarian considerations in relation to future weapons.
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